CVE-2026-83617
CVE-2026-83617 — xmldom: requireWellFormed element/attribute name validation is bypassable via an embedded line terminator
xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. From 0.9.11 until 0.9.12, the requireWellFormed: true element and attribute name checks use the anchored QName_exact expression produced by reg() in lib/grammar.js, which inherits the multiline flag. A name with a valid first line followed by U+000A, U+000D, U+2028, or U+2029 and breakout markup therefore passes validation and is emitted verbatim in element start and end tags or attribute names. This bypasses the strict-serialization checks introduced for the earlier element-name and attribute-name injection advisories, while the default serialization path remains outside the strict guarantee. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom version 0.9.12.
Published Updated Sources: cvelistV5, GitHub_M
Triage
Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the scoring sources call it.
Exploitation
Unreported
no source claims exploitation
EPSS
<1%
chance of exploitation in 30 days
CVSS base
8.7
HIGH
CISA SSVC assessment
Three decision points CISA publishes for the CVEs it assesses · SSVC 2.0.3. A stakeholder decision, not a severity score.
Exploitation
PoC
none · proof-of-concept · active
Automatable
Yes
can an attacker script all four kill-chain steps
Technical impact
Partial
partial · total control of the vulnerable component
Affected scope
The catalog records vendors and products as separate lists, not pairs, so which product belongs to which vendor is not something this page can say.
Vendors (1)
Products (1)
Every base score collected
Sources score independently and disagree; each row says who scored it and under which version.
| Score | Version | Severity | Expl. | Impact | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8.7 | CVSS 4.0 | HIGH | n/a | n/a | cvelistV5 |
Weakness & attack patterns
- CWE-91
- CWE-625
Detection
Read off the CVSS vector and the weakness class. Starting points, not rules we have tested.
- Search application, proxy, and WAF logs for requests touching /grammar.js, /xmldom.
References
4 on the record
- github.com/xmldom/xmldom/security/advisories/GHSA-jxjr-3g7g-3944
x_refsource_CONFIRM
- github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/1071
x_refsource_MISC
- github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/7b2ec67e1750daadd0bb06c92e875e726544a362
x_refsource_MISC
- github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.9.12
x_refsource_MISC
Elsewhere on this site
Not in any source we poll
Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.
- No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
- No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
- No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.